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CASE NOTES
Bankruptcy Law-WHEN IS A GOVERNMENTAL UNIT'S ACTION TO
ENFORCE ITS POLICE OR REGULATORY POWER EXEMPT FROM THE Au-
TOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS OF SECTION 362?-Schatzman v. Depart-
ment of Health and Rehabilitative Services (In re King Memorial
Hospital), 4 B.R. 704 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
Section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (the Code)
provides for an automatic stay of judicial, administrative, or other
proceedings brought against the debtor upon the debtor's filing of
a petition in bankruptcy.1 The automatic stay is designed to pro-
vide debtor protection by giving the debtor a "breathing spell"
from his creditors.' The provision for an automatic stay, however,
is not without exceptions. Section 362(b)(4) of the Code exempts
from the automatic stay an action or proceeding by a governmental
unit to enforce its police or regulatory power.5 In Schatzman v.
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (In re King
Memorial Hospital),' the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida held that Section 362(b)(4) of the Code did not
apply to a Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services
(HRS) action to forfeit the bankrupt King Memorial Hospital's ex-
emption from certificate-of-need review.5 In order to determine
when a state action falls within the Section 362(b)(4) exception,
1. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. III 1979) provides in part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title operates as a stay, applicable to all entities,
of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment
of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other proceeding against the debtor
that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate ....
2. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 340 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6296-97.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) 1979 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he filing of a petition
. . . does not operate as a stay ... of the commencement or continuation of an action or
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory
power."
4. 4 B.R. 704 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
5. Id. at 708.
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this note will examine the Schatzman decision, and other Section
362(b)(4) decisions.
On October 2, 1979, King Memorial Hospital filed a chapter 11
bankruptcy petition. A trustee was appointed by the bankruptcy
court to operate the hospital during the bankruptcy administra-
tion.' In November 1979, HRS determined that the hospital had
forfeited its exemption from certificate-of-need review to construct
a 126-bed hospital.7 HRS gave the debtor-hospital thirty days to
request an administrative hearing. 8 Responding to the HRS deter-
mination of forfeiture, the trustee filed a suggestion of bankruptcy
with HRS, citing entitlement to an automatic stay of HRS's action
pursuant to Section 362 of the Code. HRS filed an order stating
that the automatic stay provisions do not operate in an action or
proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regula-
tory powers.'
The bankruptcy court in Schatzman determined that HRS's ac-
tion was "subject to the automatic stay provision of Section 362
and [was] not the exercise of a governmental unit's police power to
6. Id. at 706.
7. Id. at 705. FLA. STAT. § 381.493(3)(d)(1979) defines certificate of need as "a written
statement issued by the department [of Health and Rehabilitative Services) evidencing
community need for a new, converted, expanded, or otherwise significantly modified health
care facility, health service, or hospice."
Normally, the construction of a 126-bed general hospital would require the hospital to file
an application for a certificate of need. In this case, however, the hospital had established its
exemption from the certificate-of-need laws pursuant to Ch. 78-194 § 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 607,
which provided: "[s]ections 381.493-381.496 shall not affect any health-care facility project
for which land has been acquired and preliminary construction plans have been prepared
and filed with the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services prior to July 1, 1973."
Since the land was acquired for the construction of the 126-bed hospital and preliminary
construction plans were filed with HRS prior to July 1, 1973, King Memorial Hospital quali-
fied for this exemption. 4 B.R. at 706.
During the months of June, July, August, September, October, and November, HRS made
several visits to the site for the proposed new King Memorial Hospital. It determined that
no construction was under way. Therefore, it decided that the hospital had forfeited its
exemption from certificate-of-need review and that the hospital would be required to obtain
a certificate-of-need in order to receive a hospital license for its proposed 126-bed hospital.
Administrative Complaint of Respondent (May 6, 1980).
Ch. 78-194 § 3, 1978 Fla. Law 608 repealed that portion of Florida Statutes 381.497 (1973)
which had established the hospital's exemption from certificate-of-need review. HRS regula-
tions 10-5.02(21) and 10-5.05(2) of the Florida Administrative Code required that an exempt
project under Ch. 78-194 § 1, 1978 Fla. Laws 607 must be under physical and continuous
construction pursuant to final construction plans being filed with HRS by July 1, 1979, to
preserve the project's exemption. "Continuous construction is defined as activities beyond
site preparation." Administrative Complaint of Respondent (May 6, 1980).
8. FLA. STAT. ch. 120 (1979) (Administrative Procedures Act).
9. 4 B.R. 704, 705-06 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
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protect the public health and safety."1 As a factor in its decision,
the court pointed to HRS's delay in bringing its determination of
forfeiture; HRS waited almost 4 2months after it could have origi-
nally initiated action, and forty-five days after the debtor had filed
its bankruptcy petition. More important, the court found that
HRS failed to demonstrate that public health and welfare was the
overriding factor in HRS's determination. The court stated that
HRS's witness gave no testimony that the protection of the public
health or welfare was at stake. Additionally, the court found that
the Health Facilities and Health Services Planning Act, under
which HRS's determination was brought, was not enacted to pro-
tect the public health and welfare." For the foregoing reasons, the
court stayed HRS's action pursuant to Section 362 of the Code. 12
In reaching its decision, the Schatzman court closely examined
the legislative history of Section 362. Since the new Bankruptcy
Code became effective on October 1, 1979, there is little case law
construing the Section 362(b)(4) exception. Accordingly, the legis-
lative history of the automatic stay provision and its exceptions
takes on added importance.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SECTION 362
The statutory automatic stay is the first phase of bankruptcy re-
lief. The automatic stay provides "the debtor a breathing spell
from his creditors."13 It allows the debtor "to attempt a repayment
or reorganization plan, or simply to be relieved of the financial
pressures that drove him into bankruptcy." ' It bars further suits
and continuation of old suits, as well as any further judicial en-
10. Id. at 708.
11. Id. at 708-09. This determination by the court is debatable. Although the Health
Facilities and Health Services Act appears oriented toward planning for and coordinating
health care facilities, these activities are arguably done in the furtherance of the protection
of the public health and welfare. Since this determination does not seem crucial to the
court's decision, and because the court stated that HRS did not present any testimony that
the public health or welfare was at stake, this note will adopt the court's position.
12. Id. at 709. The court did not reach the issue of whether HRS's action should be
stayed under Section 105 of the Code, since it found the proceeding to be stayed under
Section 362. Section 105 is an omnibus provision which allows a court to issue or lift a stay
as it deems necessary or appropriate. The legislative history of Section 362(b)(4) indicates
that it is not excepted from Section 105. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 342-3
(1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6298-99. Thus, the court still
may have been able to issue a discretionary stay under Section 105.
13. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6296-97.
14. Id. at 6297.
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forcement of judgments or lien foreclosures. Even nonjudicial col-
lection efforts are stayed under the new code. 5
The stay also protects the creditors' interests. Rather than en-
couraging "a race of diligence" for the debtor's assets, the stay
helps provide for their orderly liquidation. It prevents the debtor
from succumbing to a creditor's pressure exerted to repay his claim
"in preference to and to the detriment of other creditors."'" The
stay acts only as a procedural delay and does not affect the credi-
tor's substantive rights.17
Section 362(a) defines the broad scope of the stay. It applies to
all proceedings "including arbitration, license revocation, adminis-
trative, and judicial proceedings."'" The stay applies to all kinds of
bankruptcy cases, including liquidations and reorganizations. 9
For policy and practical reasons, the Code provides several stat-
utory exceptions to the automatic stay. In Schatzman, HRS relied
on Section 362(b)(4) to exempt it from the automatic stay. This
section provides that the filing of a bankruptcy petition does not
operate as an automatic stay "of the commencement or continua-
tion of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
[its] .. .police or regulatory power.''12
Representative Edwards explained Congress's intent in enacting
Section 362(b)(4) by stating "[tihis section is intended to be given
a narrow construction in order to permit governmental units to
pursue to protect the health and safety and not to apply to actions
by a governmental unit to protect the pecuniary interest in prop-
erty of the debtor or property of the estate." 2' A House Committee
Report provides additional insight into the purpose of Section
362(b)(4). "Where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent
or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, consumer pro-
tection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws, or attempting
to fix damages for violation of such a law, the action or proceeding
15. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1979).
16. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6297.
17. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6084.
18. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6297.
19. Id.
20. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (1979).
21. 124 CONG. REC. H11089 (daily ed. Dec. 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (quoting
Schatzman v. Dept. of HRS, 4 B.R. 704, 707 (1980)).
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is not stayed under the automatic stay."2
Thus, Section 362(b)(4) was intended by Congress to preent
overuse of the automatic stay in areas of governmental action pro-
tecting the "legitimate" interests of the state.2 3 In applying this
exception, the courts must carefully analyze the governmental
unit's action to determine if it is of the type which is exempt from
the automatic stay."'
II. WHAT IS A LEGITIMATE INTEREST OF THE STATE UNDER
SECTION 362(b)(4)?
The recent case of In re Canarico Quarries, Inc.25 illustrates the
type of proceeding by a governmental agency to enforce its regula-
tory powers to which Section 362(b)(4) is directed. Canarico Quar-
ries operated a quarry which was emitting dust in violation of the
state air pollution laws. In response to these violations, the Puerto
Rico Environmental Quality Board (the Board) initiated enforce-
ment proceedings against Canarico which finally ended in a cease
and desist order. On August 2, 1977, the company filed a petition
for reorganization under Chapter XI and received an order author-
izing it to operate its business as a debtor-in-possession. Thereaf-
ter, the Board petitioned the bankruptcy court to vacate Canar-
ico's operation and have Canarico ordered to comply with the state
air pollution regulations. The bankruptcy court denied the peti-
tion, finding the stay provisions of Bankruptcy Rule 11-44(a) ap-
plicable to the Board's proceedings."s
On appeal, the district court granted the Board's petition and
22. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6299.
23. The phrase "legitimate" interests of the state will be used throughout this piece to
mean an action taken in the interest of the public health and welfare, as opposed to action
taken to protect the pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or of the estate.
24. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 175 (1977), reprinted in f 1978] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 5963, 6135.
25. 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979).
26. Id. at 1334-35. Bankruptcy Rule 11-44(a) of the Old Bankruptcy Act provided for
the automatic stay of proceedings initiated against the debtor or his property when a peti-
tion was filed under Rule 11-6 or 11-7. The purpose of the stay was "protection from inter-
ference by creditors with the property of the debtor in such a way as to hinder the proper
administration of the property." 466 F. Supp. 1333, 1337.
Before the Code became effective in 1979, some courts in reaching their decision with
regard to whether a state action should be stayed under Rule 11-44(a) examined what the
to-be-enacted Code would do under the same situation. Thus, this court's decision under
Rule 11-44(a) discussing Section 362(b)(4) provides guidance as to the scope and interpreta-
tion to be given Section 362(b)(4).
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lifted the stay. The court stated that Rule 11-44(a) is designed to
aid the rehabilitation of the debtor, but that this rehabilitation
must be done in conformity with the laws of the jurisdiction. Since
allowing Canarico to operate its business without obtaining a per-
mit from the Environmental Quality Board would have violated
state law, the stay of Rule 11-44(a) was held inapplicable to the
Board's proceedings.2 7
Although In re Canarico Quarries, Inc. was decided shortly
before the effective date of the new code, the court found support
for its decision by reference to Section 362(b)(4). The court
pointed out that the code reflected the congressional intent that
public interest regulations outweigh the automatic stay in case of
conflict. Thus, the court indicated that the result in this case
would be the same under Section 362(b)(4). 8
A more difficult case of assessing the applicability of Section
362(b)(4) to a state action arose in In re Missouri ex rel. Runyan."9
The debtors, owners of public warehouses which were used to store
grain, granted the Missouri Department of Agriculture (the De-
partment) the authority, pursuant to a Missouri statute, to take
control of the grain in order to distribute it equitably among its
owners. Thereafter, the debtors filed for bankruptcy. The Depart-
ment then petitioned for and was granted by the state court the
appointment of a receiver to operate the debtor's warehouses.
Three days later, the bankruptcy court appointed an interim
trustee.30
After his appointment, the trustee filed an adversary proceeding
in the bankruptcy court for leave to sell all grain free and clear of
any lien. The Department then petitioned and received an order in
the state court to take possession of the warehouses. The trustee
then petitioned the bankruptcy court to enjoin the Department
from interfering with the debtor's business. The Department re-
sponded by filing a petition with the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
27. Id. at 1333, 1339-40.
28. Id. In accord with this decision is Dixon v. Grand Spaulding Dodge, Inc., No. 79 C
1416 (N.D.E.D. Ill. June 9, 1980), where the Secretary of State refused to issue the debtor
corporation an automobile dealership license after it violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Practices Act. The court held that the automatic stay provisions of Bank-
ruptcy Rule 11-44(a) did not apply to the Secretary's exercise of his police powers. The
court stated that the legislative history of Section 362 covered the exact regulatory activity
involved in this case-that is, where a governmental unit is suing a debtor to prevent fraud,
the action or proceeding is not stayed under the automatic stay. Id.
29. No. J-C-80-244 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 2, 1980).
30. Id.
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peals for a writ of prohibition to be directed to the bankruptcy
court. The court of appeals denied the petition without prejudice
and directed a stay of all proceedings until the prohibition had
been ruled upon by the district court.31
In an effort to sustain the prohibition, the Department claimed
that the state was invoking its police powers to take exclusive pos-
session of the grain for the benefit of its depositors pursuant to
Section 362(b)(4). The district court rejected this claim finding
that the Department was not "endeavoring to prevent a violation
of consumer protection, environmental protection, fraud or a simi-
lar police or regulatory law involving the safety, health, morals and
the general welfare of society, but on the contrary, petitioner's sole
objective [was] to protect the pecuniary interests in property of
purported depositors."' 2 Thus, the Department's action was found
not to be an exercise of the police and regulatory powers within the
scope of Section 362(b)(4). ss
The In re Missouri decision is consistent with the intent of Con-
gress in enacting Section 362(b)(4). Section 362(b)(4) does not ap-
ply to a governmental unit's action taken to protect the pecuniary
interest in property of the debtor, even if that action is taken in
good faith." Rather, according to the legislative history, the excep-
tion should only apply to actions taken in the interest of protecting
the public health and welfare."
Finally, the case Sisk v. Massachusetts Department of Public
Health (In re Saugus General Hospital, Inc.)," which was relied
upon by the court in Schatzman, provides insight into what is a
"legitimate" state interest. In Sisk, the debtor was a small, pri-
vately-owned hospital licensed by the Department of Public
Health (DOH). On August 30, 1978, DOH notified the hospital to
discontinue admitting patients until certain administrative defi-
ciencies, such as an inadequate number of nurses, were corrected.
The next day, a petition in bankruptcy was filed against the
debtor-hospital, after which the hospital discharged its patients
and shut down operations.3 7
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 124 CONG. REc. H11089 (daily ed. Dec. 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (quoting
Schatzman v. Dept. of HRS, 4 B.R. 704, 707 (1980)).
36. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1160 (D. Mass. 1979).
37. Id.
1981]
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The bankruptcy court thereafter appointed a receiver and issued
an injunction restraining all persons from interfering with any
property in the possession of the receiver. Two days later, DOH
notified the hospital that its license to operate was terminated pur-
suant to DOH's regulation that a hospital abandons its license by
discontinuance of operations. In response, the receiver filed a com-
plaint to determine whether the court's injunction precluded en-
forcement of DOH's automatic revocation of the hospital's license
and whether termination of the hospital's license violated the auto-
matic stay provision of Bankruptcy Rule 11-44(a). 8
In upholding the stay, the Sisk court found that DOH's decision
was not made in the exercise of its police power in furtherance of
the public welfare. Rather, the license termination was an auto-
matic revocation triggered by the discharge of the hospital's pa-
tients-a decision primarily dictated by the hospital's financial
condition. 9 The court found that "[tihe administrative deficiencies
previously cited by the Department, which could arguably be said
to jeopardize the public health and welfare, played no part in the
agency's termination of the license. ' 40 Also, prior to the filing of
the bankruptcy petition, the DOH had not indicated an intention
to revoke the hospital's license based on health reasons. In light of
all of the foregoing reasons, the court held that the license revoca-
tion was not a decision "in furtherance of the public welfare." 41
In dicta, the court in Sisk stated that the result in this case
would be the same under Section 362(b)(4) of the new code. After
examining the legislative history of the exception, the court found
that notwithstanding the police power exception, the Code "still
may permit the use of an injunction to restrain action by a regula-
tory agency."42
III. ANALYSIS
In examining the previously discussed cases dealing with Section
362(b)(4), it is important to note that the courts have imposed the
requirement that the state action be taken in the interest of the
public health and welfare in order for the exemption to the stay to
apply. This requirement is derived from the legislative history of
38. Id. at 1160-61.
39. Id. at 1162-63.
40. Id. at 1162.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1163 n.1.
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Section 362(b)(4). 43 On its face, the statute does not appear to re-
quire that the governmental unit demonstrate its "purpose" in ini-
tiating action. The only apparent requirement is that the agency
bringing the action demonstrate that it is a governmental unit, and
that its action is brought to enforce its police or regulatory powers.
If such a requirement had been imposed in Schatzman, HRS
seemingly would have qualified for the exception. Likewise, a simi-
lar result would have followed in Sisk, and possibly in In re
Missouri.
This latter position has recently been applied in NLRB v. Evans
Plumbing Co. 4 In Evans Plumbing Co., the NLRB petitioned for
entry of judgment to enforce the Board's decision that Evans had
discriminatorily discharged two employees. Evans filed for bank-
ruptcy the day before the hearing for unfair labor practices was
set. The hearing was held over Evans's objection, and the judge
found that Evans had unfairly discharged two employees, and or-
dered them reinstated with back pay. Evans opposed the entry of
judgment on the basis that the hearing should have been stayed
pursuant to Section 362."'
The Fifth Circuit upheld the judgment finding that the Board's
proceeding fell within the Section 362(b)(4) exception to the stay.
The court dealt only with the issue of whether the NLRB was a
governmental unit and whether it was enforcing its regulatory
powers. Answering these questions in the affirmative, the court
held that the NLRB proceeding qualified for the exception to the
automatic stay."
The same approach appears to have been taken in In re Na-
tional Hospital and Institutional Builders Co.47 There the bank-
ruptcy judge held that the efforts by administrative bodies in New
York City to revoke the certificate of occupancy owned by the
debtor violated the automatic stay provisions of Rule 12-43 of the
Rules of Bankruptcy procedure. The bankruptcy court found that
the city did not have a good faith belief that the home would harm
the community. To the contrary, the court felt that the state had
an interest in having the home opened. On appeal, the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York re-
43. 124 CONG. REC. H11089 (daily ed. Dec. 1978) (remarks of Rep. Edwards) (quoting
Schatzman v. Dept. of HRS, 4 B.R. 704, 707 (1980)).
44. No. 81-7001 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 1981).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. No. 80 Civ. 6073 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1981).
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versed, finding that the authority of the administrative bodies was
a matter of state regulatory power, which was outside the scope of
the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court. In dicta, the district court
indicated that the result would be the same under Section
362(b)(4) of the new code.' 8
The problem with the approach taken in Evans Plumbing Co.
and In re National Hospital and Institutional Builder Co., in ana-
lyzing whether a state action is exempt from an automatic stay, is
that it ignores the legislative history of the exception. The purpose
of initiating the action is important when deciding whether the
stay should apply. The legislative history indicates that: (1) the ex-
ception is to be given a narrow construction, and (2) that the court
should examine the state action carefully to determine if it falls
within the exception." If the analysis is only centered on whether
the agency is a governmental unit and whether it is exercising its
police or regulatory powers, then the exception is given a broad
construction. Under this approach, if the action is taken for im-
proper motives, the debtor may have to resort to state courts for
relief. This process can be slow and expensive. 50 The automatic
stay was enacted to minimize such problems. Also, if the purpose
of the action is not subject to examination, the governmental unit
may take action in order to protect a pecuniary interest in the
debtor's property. This type of action was expressly mentioned by
48. Id. See Department of Environmental Resources v. Peggs Run Coal Co., No. 1103
C.D. (Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 15, 1980). Peggs Run Coal Company had filed a petition in
bankruptcy, and thereafter became a debtor-in-possession. Subsequently, the Department
of Environmental Resources filed a complaint against Peggs Run for maintenance of a pub-
lic nuisance and numerous violations of the Clean Streams Act. Peggs Run claimed that the
Department's action was restrained by the automatic stay of Section 362. In determining
whether the stay applied, the court phrased the question as whether the Department's com-
plaint was a proceeding by a governmental unit enforcing its police or regulatory powers, or
an action for enforcement of a money judgment by a governmental unit. Finding that the
complaint was brought to enforce the Department's regulatory power, the proceeding was
not stayed.
Although this case would appear to qualify for the Section 362(b)(4) exception using "an
action taken in the interest of the public health and welfare" analysis, this approach did not
appear to be used by the court. Rather, the court found persuasive Section 362(b)(5) of the
Code which does not permit the enforcement of a money judgment in an action by a govern-
mental unit. Since this action was not the enforcement of a money judgment, and since the
court found it to be the exercise of the Department's regulatory power, the action was not
stayed. The court made no explicit analysis of whether this action was taken in the interest
of public health and welfare.
49. See text at notes 21, 24 supra.
50. This point was raised by the trustee, but rejected by the court in In re National
Hospital and Institutional Builders Co., No. 80 Civ. 6073 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1981).
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the legislative history as not deserving exception. 1
The better approach should involve analysis of the governmental
unit's purpose in bringing its proceeding. This approach will pro-
vide a more careful analysis of whether the proceeding is taken in
the interest of the public health and welfare. If it is, the action
should be exempt from the automatic stay. If not, there would
seem to be no reason not to stay the action. The debtor should not
have to suffer the cost of defending a suit if, (1) the public is not
going to benefit, and (2) the creditors will be harmed because cost
of the suit will decrease the assets available to pay off their claims.
The fear that bankruptcy would become a sanctuary for agencies
trying to escape state regulatory proceedings if such an approach
were followed does not seem realistic.5 2 The state would still be
able to enforce its "legitimate" state interests. Only those proceed-
ings not brought in the interest of protecting the public health and
welfare would be eliminated.
Accepting the proposition that the governmental unit should
demonstrate that its action was taken in the interest of public
health and safety, there still remains the question of what actions
constitute a proceeding taken "in the interest of public health and
welfare." Obviously, in a case such as Canarico Quarries, where
the governmental unit is enforcing its state air pollution laws, the
action is "legitimate." The dangers to public health and welfare if
the state would allow continued violation of the air pollution laws
is self-evident. The same can be said for the other actions men-
tioned in the House Reports as examples of governmental proceed-
ings exempt from the automatic stay, i.e., actions taken to stop
fraud or to prevent violation of environmental protection, to pro-
mote consumer protection, and to enforce safety regulations. There
is a strong public policy behind these actions that continued viola-
tions would result in harm to the public. A more difficult question
arises in cases such as Schatzman and Sisk, where the purpose of
bringing the action is unclear. In these cases the courts appeared
to require that the state governmental unit affirmatively demon-
strate that harm would result to the public if its action was stayed
or that the public would benefit if the action was not stayed.
Where a strong public policy does not underlie enforcing the ac-
51. See text at note 21, supra.
52. This fear was expressed by the court in In re National Hospital and Institutional
Builders Co., No. 80 Civ. 6073 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 1981).
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tion, as it does in the actions which were found by the House Re-
ports to deserve exemption, the courts should not automatically in-
fer that the governmental unit is acting in the interest of the
public health and welfare unless the unit so demonstrates.
The requirement of an affirmative showing of legitimate purpose
by the governmental unit bringing the action seems consistent with
the legislative history of the exception. Notwithstanding the im-
portance of allowing governmental units to enforce their regulatory
powers, the debtor should not be harassed by state actions that
will not benefit the public. The exception should be given a narrow
construction. This position should in no way impede the state in
protecting the public health and welfare interest, while at the same
time allow the debtor to enjoy the benefits of the automatic stay.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Schatzman decision provides a reasonable approach in de-
termining when a state action should be exempt from the auto-
matic stay. In Evans, the Fifth Circuit limited its inquiry to
whether the agency bringing the action was a governmental unit,
and whether the action was brought to enforce the unit's police or
regulatory powers. Although the Evans approach must initially be
taken in all cases involving Section 362(b)(4), the court's inquiry
should extend to the governmental unit's purpose in bringing its
action. A court should not assume that a governmental unit is val-
idly exercising its police or regulatory powers when it brings an
action. Instead, the governmental unit should be required to af-
firmatively demonstrate that its action will in some way benefit the
public. Obviously, the ease of satisfying this requirement will vary
from case to case, but such a requirement should insure that the
state action is taken for a "legitimate" state purpose.
When future courts are presented for the first time with the is-
sue of whether a state action should be exempt from the automatic
stay, they should follow an approach similar to that taken in the
Schatzman and Sisk cases. Such an approach will help to preserve
the protection provided the debtor by the automatic stay, while at
the same time allow a governmental unit to pursue legitimate ac-
tions in the interest of the public health and welfare.
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